Nonfinancial disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy:Evidences from CO2 emission and corporate social responsibility disclosures in the US by Rees, William & Dal Maso, Lorenzo
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nonfinancial disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy
Citation for published version:
Rees, W & Dal Maso, L 2016 'Nonfinancial disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy: Evidences from CO2
emission and corporate social responsibility disclosures in the US' pp. 1-50.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Jul. 2018
1 
 
 
Nonfinancial Disclosure and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: 
Evidences from CO2 Emission and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosures in the US 
 
 
 
 
 
Lorenzo Dal Maso† and William Rees‡* 
 
 
 
† Erasmus University Rotterdam, Erasmus School of Economics, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 
PO Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam (NL). Email: dalmaso@ese.eur.nl  
 
 
‡ The University of Edinburgh Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8 9JS, UK. 
Tel.: +44 (0) 131 651 5244. *Corresponding author: bill.rees@ed.ac.uk. 
 
 
Keywords: CO2 Emissions Disclosure, Financial Analysts Forecast Error, Forecast Bias, 
Forecast Dispersion, Corporate Social Reporting, Propensity score matching. 
 
This version: November 2016 
Acknowledgments: We acknowledge helpful comments from the participants of the British 
Accounting and Finance Association Scottish Area Group (Edinburgh), XI Workshop on 
Empirical Research in Financial Accounting (Cordoba) and the 39th Annual Congress of the 
European Accounting Association Maastricht (NL). 
  
2 
 
Nonfinancial Disclosure and Analyst Forecast Accuracy: 
Evidences from CO2 Emission and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosures in the US 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
We examine the association with analyst forecast quality of both CO2 emission disclosure and 
corporate social reporting for a sample of large US firms. Using a matched sample we find, for 
a one, two and three-year horizons, a significant reduction in error, bias and forecast dispersion 
and a significant improvement of the analysts’ information environment for those firms that 
disclose CO2 emissions. However, we confirm a significant negative association between 
corporate social responsibility reporting and forecast error only for a one-year horizon and bias 
for a one and two-year horizon. Previous work had demonstrated a significant negative 
association between forecast error and CSR disclosure for an international sample but not for 
the US. Our results suggest nonfinancial disclosure is relevant even in a liberal market economy 
with transparent financial reporting.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
We investigate the impact of disclosure of both Corporate Social Reporting (hereinafter CSR) 
and CO2 Emissions Disclosure (hereinafter CED) on the accuracy, bias and dispersion of 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and on the analysts’ information environment. Prior research has 
suggested that CSR has a significant negative association with forecast error in many countries 
but a positive albeit insignificant association in the United States (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, 
Tsang, and Yang 2012). We found that result puzzling. We also note that sell-side analysts 
exhibit considerably more interest in CED than other elements of non-financial reporting 
typical of the contents of a CSR document (Eccles, Serafeim, and Krzus, 2011). Our objectives 
are therefore to re-examine the contention that the US is a special case with regards to the 
importance of nonfinancial disclosures and whether CSR is a relatively blunt indicator of 
nonfinancial disclosures when contrasted with CED. 
We contrast CO2 emissions disclosures with the general aspects of corporate social 
reporting as we view environmental measures as more directly related to costs than the general 
elements of CSR, which may include important aspects of social or ethical behaviour but may 
be less relevant to earnings expectations. Indeed Eccles et al. (2011) provide evidence which 
suggests that broker-dealers, the source of earnings forecasts, are about ten times more likely 
to examine CED disclosures in Bloomberg than other elements of CSR for an international 
sample including the US. Whilst they also show that for their full sample of Bloomberg users 
CED is influential outside the US whereas governance measures tend to be more influential in 
the US, the magnitude of the dominance of CED for broker-dealers is too large to be explained 
by international differences. We therefore have evidence which suggests that the analysts 
producing earnings forecasts are more interested in CED than CSR and hypothesize that CED 
may be more important than CSR in explaining analyst forecast quality. Despite this apparent 
importance of CED we view such disclosure as an indicator of good environmental disclosure 
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in general in the same way that issuing a corporate social report can be seen as an indicator of 
good social reporting in general.  
Prior research has demonstrated a statistically significant association between CSR and 
reduced forecast error for a large international sample largely comprising firms in developed 
economies (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). It is important to note that the US was an exception and 
indeed, of the 31 countries in their sample, only the US had a positive coefficient on the 
relationship between CSR and one-year horizon forecast error. The authors demonstrate that 
their overall result are weaker where firms operate in a liberal market economy and are subject 
to less transparent financial accounting but this result might also be driven by the US sample 
which makes up 40% on the total. Australia, Canada, and the UK all show significant negative 
association between forecast error and CSR. The authors note that in the US few firms provided 
CSR reports, they were relative short and rarely independently assured and it is possible that 
the result for the US, and for the liberal economies in general, given the US sample influence, 
are driven by limited commitment to CSR reporting in the US during the Dhahliwal et al. (2012) 
sample period. In our data the percentage of firms issuing reports jumped from 5 percent in 
2006 to 30% in 2007, the last year included in the Dhahliwal et al. (2012) sample. Thus, there 
is a case for re-examining the previous results in the light of the substantial increase in the US 
use of CSR reports in the last decade. 
Whilst it may readily be proposed that there is greater scepticism regarding corporate 
social responsibility in general in the US than in other developed economies we view the 
argument that social costs have a less profound impact on firms in the US than in other 
developed economies as more contentious. It is certainly possible that the legal and regulatory 
environment can affect whether social costs are born by the firm or not. It is also probably that 
many of the costs and benefits of corporate social responsibility are similar for US and 
European firms. This is an empirical question which we do not address here other than to test 
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the contention that CSR reports are not associated with financial analysts’ information 
environment in the US. 
However, as acknowledged by Dhaliwal et al. (2012), attitudes to climate change, and 
hence the impact on the financial performance of climate change, are particularly sceptical in 
the US. This contrasts with the previously cited results from Eccles et al. (2011) which suggests 
that carbon disclosures are of considerable interest to financial analysts. Carbon disclosures are 
typically made via CDP, GRI or occasionally via self-made reporting. The requirements of the 
CDP and GRI procedures are closely defined and constrain the firm rather more than the largely 
unregulated CSR. The firm has to complete a series of explicit questions concerning, strategy, 
governance, emissions and targets which may well end up as a 100-page document and the 
level of reporting and carbon emissions performance are assessed and graded by CDP. In our 
sample the percentage of firms issuing carbon disclosure reports climbs from 15 percent in 2003 
to 36 percent in 2009. Given that CED is more common than CSR, at least in the early years of 
our sample, and CED is more highly controlled than CSR it is feasible that CED is a stronger 
indicator of the information environment than CSR. We are therefore interested to re-examine 
the role of CSR in general, and CED in particular, in the US given the surprising (for us) prior 
evidence that CSRs are not significantly related to the analysts’ information environment in the 
US.  
In our empirical analysis we expand the analysis to a broad investigation of the analysts’ 
information environment from a unique focus on forecast error and also reconsider the 
empirical approach. We investigate the effect of CED and CSR on mean forecast error, as in 
previous papers, and both forecast bias and forecast dispersion. We include dispersion, as it is 
possible that mean forecast error might be driven by bias, whereas low dispersion may 
accompany inaccurate consensus. If CED assists analysts in their forecasting activities it should 
both improve accuracy and reduce dispersion.  
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We base our conclusions on a propensity score matching approach (hereinafter PSM). 
The association, or lack of it in the US, between CSR and forecast error is robustly 
demonstrated in the previous literature but it is clearly conceivable that any causal relationship 
may be exaggerated or reduced by endogeneity.  
For our sample of up to 2,725 firm-years observations drawn from 2003 to 2009, using 
PSM approach, we find a negative and statistically significant relationship between total 
emissions disclosure and forecast error, bias and dispersion for all forecast horizons from one 
to three years ahead. The relatively short window is constrained by data availability before 2003 
and changes in regulation after 2009 when elements of carbon disclosure became regulated. In 
addition, our regression results, which are based on the matched sample resulting from PSM, 
reveal that CSR reporting is negatively correlated with forecast error, bias and dispersion albeit 
with unstable and weak statistically significance which lead us to support Dhaliwal et al.’s 
(2012) previous results.  
Thus we report evidence that is consistent with CED reducing earnings forecast errors, 
but it remains possible that CED is a surrogate for other firm specific characteristics that reflect 
the information disclosure environment of the firm or the incentives for analysts to produce 
accurate forecasts, although our main analysis control for several firm’s level governance 
characteristics. While this does not rule out alternative explanations playing a roll it remains 
consistent with CED providing information to analysts regarding future costs and benefits for 
the firm where emission emissions are important.  
Whilst investors and analysts may be interested in CED for various reasons, including 
ethical as well as investment related, our focus on earnings forecasting implies that our results 
are driven by the impact of these disclosures on the information set available to analysts for 
financial decision making. Thus if CED helps analysts to produce better forecasts of earnings 
it would appear to be driven by the utility of these disclosures for identifying future costs and/or 
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benefits. It could be argued that firms choosing to disclose nonfinancial information are those 
where there are greater incentives to the analysts to produce accurate forecasts or that these 
firms are the sort of firms that provide better financial disclosures. This is difficult to refute but 
we contend that our empirical approach provides convincing evidence that the information 
environment of the disclosures which facilitates better forecasting. 
Our research provides evidence that CEDs are indeed important for financial analysts 
and supports previous evidence that analysts pay more attention to emissions disclosures than 
other non-financial characteristics of firms. We are also able to demonstrate that even in the 
US, an environment thought relatively un-receptive to corporate social reporting, such 
disclosures are important for financial decision making. Our results point to future possibilities 
for research as we do not comment on the costs or benefits of CED and the resulting 
improvement in earnings forecasting. These costs and benefits may fall on the analysts 
themselves, corporate executives, investors or society in general. It may well be that forecast 
accuracy is a relatively minor element of these costs and benefits but our results are clearly 
inconsistent with CED being irrelevant. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section presents the 
literature review, while in the third section we present sample, model and variables. In section 
four, we present results of the data analysis, while in section five we discuss the findings and 
implications of this study. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
Over the last decade an increasing number of firms have adopted CSR disclosure (Campbell, 
Moore, and Metzger 2002; Peloza and Shang 2011; Zhang, Tong, Su, and Cui 2015) and this 
has stimulated studies regarding the role CSR plays in firms’ valuation (Moser and Martin 
2012). Our sample shows that less than 3 percent of US firms published CSR reports in 2003 
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whereas almost 30 percent did in 2009. Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang and Yang (2011, 2014) demonstrate 
that firms engaged in CSR strategies generally benefit from a lower cost of equity capital; Kim, 
Park and Wier (2012) reports lower earnings management; Jo and Harjoto (2014) find higher 
analyst following; Ioannou and Serafeim (2015) find more favourable analysts 
recommendation; and Dhaliwal et al. (2012) report higher analyst forecast accuracy in general 
– but not in the US.  
Dhaliwal et al. (2011) examine the relation existing between voluntary disclosure of 
CSR activities and the firms’ cost of equity capital. With a sample of US firms during the span 
1993 to 2007 they find that firms with a high cost of equity capital in the previous year tend to 
initiate disclosure of CSR activities in the current year and that initiating firms with superior 
social responsibility performance enjoy a subsequent reduction in the cost of equity capital. Yet 
when Dhaliwal et al. (2014) extend their analysis to an international setting, with a sample of 
5,135 standalone CSR reports published by 1,093 unique firms from 1995 to 2007 across 31 
countries, they find that disclosure on social issues is negatively associated with the cost of 
equity capital and that this negative association is stronger in countries that are more 
stakeholder-oriented. The authors also find that initiating firms with superior CSR performance 
attract dedicated institutional investors and analyst coverage and achieve lower absolute 
forecast errors and dispersion.  
With particular relevance to this study Dhaliwal et al. (2012) use a cross-country sample 
from 1994-2007 and they analyse the relation existing between the presence of a stand-alone 
CSR report and analyst accuracy (measured by analysts forecast error). They find that the 
issuance of a stand-alone CSR report is significantly associated with lower analyst forecast 
errors. Moreover, they also interact the stand-alone presence of CSR report with different 
country-variables; as a result, they provide evidence that CSR accompanies lower forecast error 
in countries with a stronger stakeholder focus and for firms and countries with more opaque 
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traditional financial disclosures. Dhaliwal et al.’s (2012) results could be explained by Kim et 
al. (2012) who find that socially responsible firms are less likely to manage earnings, to 
manipulate real operating activities, and to be the subject of SEC investigations hence 
delivering more transparent and reliable financial information to investors as compared to firms 
that do not meet the same social criteria. That is, socially responsible firms differ from other 
firms in their financial reporting and hence analyst accuracy is higher as a result of a reduction 
in earnings management. 
Harjoto and Jo (2015), based on a sample of 2,034 US firms from 1993 through 2009, 
examine how the sell-side analysts interpret firms’ CSR activities. Using the KLD strengths 
and concerns ratings, they examine the differential impact of overall, legal, and normative CSR 
on the analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion, stock return volatility, cost of equity capital, and 
firm value. Overall CSR intensity reduces analyst dispersion of earnings forecast, volatility of 
stock return and cost of capital (COC), and increases firm value; moreover, legal (normative) 
CSR decreases (increases) analysts’ dispersion, stock return volatility, and COC, while legal 
(normative) CSR increases (decreases) firm value.  
Ioannou and Serafeim (2015), using a sample of US listed firms during 1993-2007, 
explore the impact of CSR ratings (i.e. KLD strengths and concerns rating) on sell-side 
analysts’ assessments of firms’ future financial performance. Their main result is that on the 
early ‘90s analysts issue more pessimistic recommendations for firms with high CSR ratings 
while during recent years there has been a progressively shift whereas analyst produce 
optimistically recommendations for firm with higher CSR rating.  
However, these studies focus on the CSR reporting / performance while there is little 
evidence regarding the role of environmental disclosure in influencing analysts behaviours even 
if such disclosure is now becoming noteworthy for analysts (Eccles et al. 2011).  
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Clarkson, Fang, Li and Richardson (2013), through a sample of public U.S. companies 
from five polluting industries that report Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data spanning from 
2003 to 2006, discovered that voluntary environmental disclosure provides relevant 
information which enhances firm value. That said, “Voluntary environmental disclosures 
provide incremental information useful for predicting future financial performance given a 
knowledge of current TRI” (Clarkson et al. 2013, 430). Therefore, according to those authors, 
voluntary environmental disclosures can be viewed as “an equilibrium outcome from a 
selection process and such disclosures enhance financial performance prediction [...] 
transparent voluntary environmental disclosures increase firm value provided that they are 
perceived as credible by investors and convey information incremental to what investors 
already know about the firm’s environmental performance [...] to serve this role, once again, 
they have to be viewed as credible and convey incremental information” (Clarkson et al. 2013, 
411).    
However, and in contrast to Clarkson et al. (2013), two recent papers (Matsumura, 
Prakash, and Vera-Munoz 2014; Saka and Oshika 2014) provide evidence of a negative relation 
between market value of equity and environmental disclosure. In particular, these are relevant 
because they use as an environmental disclosure proxy the value of carbon emissions, as 
provided by the CDP, in the US and Japanese market. Matsumura et al. (2014), using the S&P 
500 during the span 2006 to 2008, investigate the effects on firm value of carbon emissions and 
of the act of voluntarily disclosing carbon emissions. Correcting for self-selection bias from 
managers’ decisions to disclose carbon emissions, they find that, on average, for every 
additional thousand metric tons of carbon emissions, firm value decreases by $212,000, where 
the median emissions for the disclosing firms in our sample are 1.07 million metric tons 
indicating that the market penalizes all firms for their carbon emissions with a special impact 
on firms that do not disclose emissions information. Indeed “with respect to its environmental 
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activities, a firm's disclosure may provide competitors with information about particular 
production process inefficiencies, costing structures, expansion plans or product reliability. 
This information may allow competitors to gain an advantage over the firm in its relations with 
customers, suppliers or regulators” (Aerts et al. 2008, 646). 
 Similarly Saka and Oshika (2014), using a Japanese sample of 150 firms during 2006 
up to 2008, examined the impact of corporate carbon emissions and disclosure on corporate 
value. They find that corporate carbon emissions have a negative relation with the market value 
of equity, the disclosure of carbon management has a positive relation with the market value of 
equity, and the positive relation between the disclosure of carbon management and the market 
value of equity is stronger with a larger volume of carbon emissions.  
Therefore, these results are consistent with the argument that capital markets impound 
corporate social reports, carbon emissions and the act of voluntary disclosure of this 
information in firm valuations (Matsumura et al. 2014). However, stock market participants 
relay on information gathered and analysed by financial analysts, perceived as capital markets' 
gatekeepers (Aerts et al. 2008). Thus, since Aerts et al. (2008) find that environmental 
disclosure is associated with a decrease in analysts' forecast dispersion both in continental 
Europe and in North America; we should expect a positive valuation of such disclosure. With 
our research we shed light on the understanding of how analysts perceive CSR in general and 
CED in particular and how this information impacts on their valuation methods.  
 
III. SAMPLE, VARIABLES AND ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
3.1. Sample selection 
This study combines accounting and environmental information data taken from Worldscope 
and ASSET4 via Datastream with analyst data are from the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S).  
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Previous studies that used CED as a variable of interest collected information from the 
Carbon Disclosure Project1  (CDP) dataset (e.g Luo, Lan, and Tang 2012; Tauringana and 
Chithambo 2015; Peters and Romi 2014; Matsumura et al. 2014). As ASSET4 has fully 
incorporated the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) dataset in October 20122, in our study we 
use the value of total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emission in tons as CED data.  
Our analysis includes all the US firms followed by ASSET4 from 2003 to 2009.3 We 
choose a single country sample as a) we are motivated in part by the anomalous US result from 
Dhaliwal et al. (2012), b) in using one country we can abstract from the impact of country 
characteristics over regression results and c) because carbon disclosure is regulated, and often 
mandated, differently worldwide4. Over the last 20 years a number of mandatory or voluntary 
government schemes have emerged which require or encourage enterprises to measure and 
report their GHG emissions (Kauffmann, Less, and Teichmann 2012). In September 2009 the 
US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a rule for mandatory reporting of GHG for 
suppliers of fossil fuels or industrial GHG, manufacturers of vehicles and engines, and in 
general facilities that emit 25.000 metric tons, or more, of GHG emissions per year (starting in 
September 2011 for year 2010). Our sample is restricted to year end (i.e. December) 2009 as 
the provision of carbon information is on a voluntary basis up to that date.  
Table 1 reports the sample derivation from the initial dataset of 10,070 firm-year 
observations, we removed firms with: a) fiscal year closing date different from the 31st of 
December and b) missing accounting, market and environmental data. Our resulting sample 
contains 2,725 firm-year observations (597 firms) spanning from 2003 to 2009 distributed as 
                                                        
1 The CDP, an independent not-for-profit organization acting on behalf of hundreds of institutional investors, holds 
the largest repository of carbon emissions information (Source: https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Pages/About-
Us.aspx). For a detailed list of academic research that use CDP as main dataset, see the dedicated internet web 
page: https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Results/Pages/academic-data.aspx.  
2  Useful information regarding the list of variables ingested by ASSET4, see Datastream Extranet Source: 
http://extranet.datastream.com/news_events/newweb/OctDec_2012/ContentEnhancement/CE5.pdf 
3 The North America list of firms followed by Asset 4 (LARGNNA) includes both US and Canada firms. Since 
Canada and US have different legislation on Carbon Disclosure we dropped Canadian firms.  
4 For a detailed overview of worldwide GHG reporting rules see Kauffmann et al. (2012). 
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shown in Table 2.  The sample size grows steadily from 208 in 2003 to 583 in 2009, and the 
proportion of firms publishing CSR grows from 2 to 30 percent and CED disclosers increase 
from 14 to 36 percent. 
 
[Insert Table 1 & 2 about here] 
 
3.2. Dependent variable: Analyst forecast accuracy and dispersion 
In our study, the initial variables of interest are analysts’ EPS Forecast Error, Dispersion and 
Bias. Following Dhaliwal et al. (2012) we use analyst forecast errors as an inverse measure of 
forecast accuracy while following Athanassakos and Kalimipalli (2003) we use the standard 
deviation of analysts' forecasts as the dispersion measure. All the variables used to measure 
error, bias and dispersion (see appendix A and B) are taken from IBES in order to increase the 
comparability. Forecast Error is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the 
mean EPS forecast and the realized EPS; Bias is the difference between mean EPS forecast and 
the realized EPS while Dispersion is the standard deviation of mean EPS forecast. All these 
three dependent variables are scaled by the stock price at the date of forecast issuing, as 
provided by IBES5 and showed in Figure 1 (Behn, Choi, and Kang 2008)6:  
(1) Error (j) = ABS [EPS_mean_Forecast (j) – EPS_Actual (j)] / Price 
(2) Bias (j) = [EPS_mean_Forecast (j) – EPS_Actual (j)] / Price 
(3) Dispersion (j) = Standard Deviation of EPS_mean_Forecast (j) / Price 
where j represents the forecast period: one, two and three year ahead. For each year we 
selected the forecast estimation provided by analysts on the third Friday of March to ensure that 
                                                        
5 In order to preserve the number of observations included into the final sample, we replace 0 if the number of 
forecast was 1 and IBES reports the value of standard deviation as missing.  
6 Firm subscripts are suppressed 
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analysts have had enough time to obtain and analyze firm’s financial and non–financial 
information (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2015) and we link the related error with the accounting and 
environmental information disclosed at the fiscal year end before the analyst made the forecast 
(see figure 1).  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
3.3. Empirical models 
Following Dhaliwal et al. (2012), we consider Error, Bias and Dispersion function of CED/CSR 
and a set of control variables as follows:  
Forecast error (j), Bias (j), Dispersion (j) = f (CED/CSR, control variables) 
However, it is clearly probable that a standard pooled cross-sectional and time-series 
model of this type would be subject to endogeneity. This could come from a variety of sources 
but we are particularly concerned that omitted correlated variables would play a role. We use 
the PSM technique because the estimated results from non-matched samples would likely be 
biased by endogeneity between a firm’s decision to report CED/CSR report and analysts’ usage 
of such information.7  
Using PSM provides greater assurance that the estimated results are not driven by 
omitted unobservable firm characteristics. PSM reduces reliance on the specification of 
the relation between variables (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). Therefore, we use the 
following logit model to estimate the determinants of a firm’s decision to report CED/CSR 
and compute propensity scores for each firm in year t (firm subscripts are suppressed).  
Following previous literature, we control for various factors that are likely to influence 
CED disclosure and CSR reporting. These are CSR Index is 1 if a firm reports on belonging to 
                                                        
7 See Shipman et al. (2015) for a review of literature on this topic. 
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a specific sustainability index (e.g. Mackenzie, Rees, and Rodionova 2013), 0 otherwise; 
Bribery is 1 if the firm is at time t under the spotlight of the media because of a controversy 
linked to bribery and corruption, political contributions, improper lobbying, money laundering, 
parallel imports or any tax fraud, 0 otherwise; Cross Listing 1 if a firms is listed in more than 1 
stock exchange, 0 otherwise; Gov_Score which measures the difference between firm i 
governance score over the minimum governance score for each industry-year (e.g., Francis et 
al., 2005); ESI is 1 if the firm belongs to any one of five environmentally sensitive industries 
(2-digit SIC: 13, 26, 28, 29, 33), 0 otherwise (Peters and Romi, 2014); ROA is the ratio between 
net income and lagged total asset; Var_Earnings is the natural logarithms of firm’s net income, 
deflated by the number of shares, standard deviation based on the past three year rolling 
window8; Loss is 1 if the firm reports  negative current earnings (Dhaliwal et al. 2012); Analyst 
is the number of estimates of EPS forecast as provided by IBES (Hope 2003; Dhaliwal et al. 
2012; Jo and Harjoto 2014); Size the natural logarithm of lagged total asset (Dhaliwal et al. 
2012); Portion is the ratio between firm’s revenue  at time t and the sum of industry (Dhaliwal 
et al. 2012) revenue for the same year; Lev is the lagged ratio between total debt and lagged 
total asset; TobinQ is the ratio between market value (i.e. market capitalization plus total value 
of debt) and lagged total asset; Capex is the ratio of capital expenditure over lagged total asset 
(Dhaliwal et al. 2012). Variable source and definition are provided in appendix A and B. 
 
(a) CEDt / CSRt = β0 + β1 Analyst FY (j) + β2 Briberyt + β3 Cross Listing + β4 Gov_Scoret                    
+ β5 ROAt + β6 CSR Indext + β7 ESI + β8 Var_Earningt + β9 Losst + β10 Sizet            
+ β11 Portiont + β12 Leveraget + β13 TobinQt + β14 Capext + Year_Control + ɛt 
 
                                                        
8 Similar to Dhaliwal et al. (2012). However, we set the rolling window on three years, rather than 5 years, in order 
to preserve final sample.  
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We match observations using the odds ratio of the propensity score estimated from 
model (a) with a maximum caliper distance of 1 percent to ensure appropriate matching 
(Matsumura et al. 2014).9 We impose a common support by dropping treatment observations 
whose propensity score is higher (lower) than the maximum (the minimum) propensity score 
of the controls.  Next, once obtained the frequency weight from the psmatch procedure, we 
estimate the following OLS model on the matched sample:  
 
 (b) Accuracyt = β0 + β1 CEDt + β2 Briberyt + β3 Cross Listing + β4 Gov_Scoret + β5 ROAt                  
+ β6 CSR Indext + β7 ESI + β8 Var_Earningt + β9 Losst + β10 Analyst FY (j)                        
+ β11 Sizet + β12 Portiont + β13 Leveraget + β14 TobinQt + β15 Capext                                    
+ Year_Control + ɛt 
 
(c) Accuracyt = β0 + β1 CSRt + β2 Briberyt + β3 Cross Listing + β4 Gov_Scoret + β5 ROAt                  
+ β6 CSR Indext + β7 ESI + β8 Var_Earningt + β9 Losst + β10 Analyst FY (j)                        
+ β11 Sizet + β12 Portiont + β13 Leveraget + β14 TobinQt + β15 Capext                                    
+ Year_Control + ɛt 
 
In our study CED and CSR are taken from ASSET4 and represent, respectively, the 
total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emission in tons (ENERDP023) and if the company publish a 
separate sustainability report or publish a section in its annual report on sustainability 
(CGVSDP026). With respect to emissions, we use total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emission 
instead of other different measures available on ASSET4 (e.g. Scope1, Scope2 or Scope3 
                                                        
9 In our main specifications, we adopt the single nearest-neighbor matching method as this produce an integer 
frequency of the weight used in the second stage of our analysis. We check the robustness of our main results by 
using alternative matching method such as Radius, local linear regression and 5 neighbors. Untabulated results 
reveal that our main analysis is consistent even using different matching approaches.    
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equivalent emission)10 because the lack of common standards in measuring different firm’s 
operational emissions may add some biases into our analysis.  
We convert the disclosure proxy into a dichotomous variable. In fact, since we are 
interested on disclosure per se’ rather than the value disclosed, we set CED=1 if firm i discloses 
at time t its value of total CO2 and CO2 equivalents emission, while we use CED=0 if firm i has 
an environmental score provided by ASSET4 at time t and, contextually, does not have any 
value of emission for the same period. In doing so, we are sure that firm i is followed by 
ASSET4 but does not disclose emission information for that specific year.   
In contrast to Dhaliwal et al. (2012), who control for firms level of earnings 
management using a measure of firm-level financial transparency measured by country-, 
industry-, and year-adjusted total scaled accruals based on that of Bhattacharya et al. (2003), 
we use Gov_Score, Bribery and CSR Index as potential substituting proxies of accounting 
quality for the following twofold reasons. As a first measuring the abnormal accruals level 
would have been limited our sample more than using Asset4 ready to use governance variables, 
and then because we expect that controlling for level of governance performance score, or 
number of a controversy linked to unethical practice, or whether a firm belongs to a specific 
sustainability index can represent a valid alternative proxy for earnings quality.  
 
 
IV. RESULTS 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
                                                        
10 Companies report GHG emissions from sources they own or control as scope 1 (direct emission), emissions 
from the generation of purchased or acquired electricity, steam, heating, or cooling consumed by the reporting 
company are considered scope 2 (indirect emission) while scope 3 (mostly optional) covers all indirect emissions 
(not included in scope 2) that occur in the value chain of the reporting company, including both upstream and 
downstream emissions. For details over the three different measures of Scope, please see he GHG protocol “A 
Corporate Accounting and Reporting Standard” available at: http://www.ghgprotocol.org/standards/corporate-
standard and “Corporate Value Chain (Scope 3) Accounting and Reporting Standard” available at: 
http://www.ghgprotocol.org/standards/scope-3-standard. 
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Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regressions. All firm-level 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and the 99th percentiles to reduce the potential 
effect of outliers. As reported in panel A, on average 25 percent of firms disclose CO2 emission 
while 17 percent  use CSR reporting. As expected, on average errors, bias and dispersion 
(number of analysts) increase (decrease) with the increasing of the forecast period. That is, the 
higher the forecast period the lower the accuracy and the number of analysts producing forecast 
estimations. In addition, on average our sample present 10 percent  of firms listed into a CSR 
index, 13 percent  report a loss during the current year, 13 percent  are under the spotlight of 
media for an “unethical” practice, 19 percent  operate in an environmental sensitivity industry, 
while the governance performance score is 22.26.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
In panels B and C we report the differences in accounting and environmental data across 
the two samples of disclosers and none. If we consider the two groups we can see that, on 
average, carbon emissions disclosures and corporate social reporters both are less likely to be 
loss making (significant only for CED), are more dominant in their markets, are more likely to 
be in an environmentally sensitive industry (p<0.01). Most significantly the disclosing firms 
have a higher number of analyst producing forecast (p<0.01), lower forecast errors (p<0.01 for 
emission disclosures) and dispersion (p<0.01 for CSR disclosures) at all three horizons.  
The descriptive statistics presented above generally support the use of a PSM matched 
sample. The differences across the two sub-samples indicate the importance of appropriately 
matching observations and controlling for a number of differences that could complicate 
statistical inferences.  
The correlation matrix is presented in table 4. Consistent with previous literature 
(Prado‐Lorenzo, Rodríguez‐Domínguez, Gallego‐Álvarez, and García‐Sánchez 2009; Luo et 
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al. 2012; Peters and Romi 2014), carbon emission disclosure and CSR reporting are positively 
(negatively) correlated, statistically significant at 1 percent, with CSR Index, Size, Bribery, 
Governance Score, Portion and ESI (Tobin Q and Loss). This means that the higher the firm’s 
size, governance score, portion of revenues by industry-year the higher the probability to have 
a carbon emission disclosure and CSR reporting. Additionally, the positive correlation 
coefficients above suggest that CED and CSR disclosers are firms operating in Environmental 
sensitivity industry, included into a specific sustainable index, and under the spotlight of media 
for unethical practices. Finally, CED and CSR present different significance across DVs. Indeed 
are both negatively correlated with forecast errors, bias and dispersions (only CED), however 
only CED is statistically supported (p<0.01). 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 
4.2. Relation between CED/CSR reporting and analysts’ accuracy   
In the first stage of our analysis, we rerun a regression as in Dhaliwal et al. (2012)11. Unreported 
results show that the simple OLS method, without matched samples, produces negative 
coefficient on accuracy, bias and dispersion for both CED and CSR but with a weak 
significance unstable across FY1-FY3. We suspect that these results will be sensitive to 
endogeneity and believe that the PSM matched results will be more reliable.  
Tables 5 to 7, report the logit matching regression results, the resultant distribution of 
the control variables across the matched samples and OLS regression results on the matched 
samples. Table 5 (Panel A to C) demonstrates that the predictive model determinants of CED 
and CSR used in the LOGIT model are statistically significant at conventional levels, meaning 
                                                        
11 That is, following authors, we run OLS regression model with year and industry control and standard error 
clustered by firm. Available upon request.  
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that in the first phase of matching procedure we control for several determinant of non-financial 
disclosure. The direct comparison of the average treatment effect for error, bias and dispersion 
shows that all three are significantly negative for CED at FY1, whereas error and bias are 
significantly negative for FY2 and FY3. Conversely for CSR we find significance only for bias 
at FY2 (p<0.05) while the others DVs across the three forecast horizons do not demonstrate a 
significant difference between the treatment and control samples. Indeed dispersion is higher 
in the treatment group than in the control group for both FY2 and FY3.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
The results in table 6 (Panel A to C) confirm that the control variables are closely 
matched between the treatment and control samples. The matching appears to be successful as 
the matched samples exhibit little imbalance (i.e. no statistical difference between the treated 
and the control group) between the main firm-specific variables employed in our multivariate 
analyses.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
  
In tables 7 we report the OLS regression results for all three horizons (Panel A to C). 
Again, we adopt regression model approach only for the matched sample using the frequency 
weight resulting from the Propensity Score Matching procedure above. There is a strong 
negative association between CED and analysts forecast error, bias and dispersion for all three 
forecast horizons (at conventional statistically significance). For CSR reporting there is also a 
negative correlation between CSR and analysts forecast error, bias and dispersion yet these 
results are statistically significant only at FY1, mostly insignificant otherwise.  These results 
are consistent with our underlying hypothesis that carbon emissions disclose is a stronger 
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indicator of better information for forecasting than is corporate social reporting and are likely 
consistent with the results for the US reported by Dhaliwal et al. (2012).  
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
The analysis above shows that both CED and CSR are negatively associated with 
forecast accuracy whether measured directly by looking at forecast error, bias, or indirectly by 
examining forecast dispersion (significant only for CED). The results are clear as to which is 
the more powerful indicator. The results are consistent with Eccles et al. (2011), who suggested 
that brokers are more interested in CED information than general CSR.  
 
4.3. Sensitivity tests  
Our review of the literature suggests some variation is to be expected in the 
effectiveness of the model. As a first sensitivity check, we run the analysis by replacing median 
estimation of EPS forecast rather than the mean estimation. In doing so we reduce the impact 
of extreme values. Unreported results confirm our results in tables 5 to 7.  
We then investigate whether our results are consistent when we estimate the models 
across firms for which we have data in all years. We are aware that using a selection criteria 
that requires dependent variables for the three different forecast horizon may leads to the 
introduction of a survivorship bias, but again unreported results prove that for the restricted 
sample results are the same (with a lower level of significance for error of CED in FY1).  
In addition there could be a substantial variation in reporting practice within the 
industry. Indeed there are industries where the percentage of CED disclosure is less (above) 
than 10 percent (90 percent), by year. Therefore, we decided to remove such extremes values. 
Results are qualitatively similar to our main findings.  
22 
 
As a last check we test the robustness of our results by dropping all the observations 
before 2007. In fact, as table 2 shows, there is an increase in CSR reporting across 2006/2007. 
Is our idea that this change in practice can be mostly due to the release of the third generation 
of the GRI guidelines in 2006. Therefore, in order to avoid any possible influence arising from 
such exogenous shock, we drop from our main analysis all the firm-years observations before 
2007. Untabulated results show that our main inferences are qualitative the same with a higher 
significance for results in Table 7 Panel A (either for CED or CSR).  
 
4.4. Additional Analysis  
Taken together, all the sensitivity above let us believe that our main inferences are 
reliable. However, we decide to use an alternative approach and we investigate whether CED 
and CSR influence the properties of analysts’ information environment such as uncertainty. 
Rather than using forecast error, bias and dispersion we follow the approach of Lehavy, Li and 
Merkley (2011) and we focus on aggregate measures of overall and common analysts’ 
uncertainty to test whether our variables of interest influence analysts’ information 
environment. We define analysts’ overall and common uncertainty using the following 
equations derived by Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998). In their study, Barron et al. (1998) 
built an empirical measures of the overall uncertainty  as the sum of the idiosyncratic and the 
common uncertainty and the common uncertainty in analyst forecasts measured through the 
accuracy, the dispersion, and the number of analyst forecasts. Accordingly, our two measure of 
common and overall uncertainty are as follows: 
 
(𝑎)UncertaintyAll (j) =  [(1 −  
1
NumAnalysts (j)
) x Dispersion (j)] + Accuracy (j) 
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(𝑏)UncertaintyCommon (j) =  
Accuracy (j) −  
Dispersion (j)
NumAnalysts (j)
UncertaintyAll (j)
 
 
where, Num_Analysts, Accuracy and Dispersion are, respectively, the number of 
analysts producing EPS forecast, the squared difference between the mean EPS forecast and 
the realized EPS and the standard deviation of mean EPS forecast for the FY j. In order to 
increase the comparability and decrease the influence of extreme values or potential nonlinear 
relation, we convert both measures of uncertainty as by-year decile rank specifications (e.g., 
Barron, Byard and Yu, 2008) while, in order to avoid any scale effect, we deflated uncertainty 
overall by the market price at the date of forecast. Additionally, similarly to Lehavy et al. (2011) 
we perform the analysis on the uncertainty measures only for those firms with at least two 
analysts following it in each forecast period (j) 12.   
Table 8, Panel A to D, reports results for Overall (a) and Common Uncertainty (b). 
Panel A reveals that there is a statistically significant difference in both measures of uncertainty 
for firms that report both CED (p<0.01) while no statically support for CSR reporting firms. 
These results are also corroborated by regression results in Panel C and D. As reported CED 
and CSR are negatively associated with both measures of uncertainty with a higher magnitude 
and significance for overall uncertainty. In other words, firms disclosing CSR and CED reduce 
either the overall uncertainty on the analyst information environment or the common part of 
uncertainty shared by analysts however this result is statistically supported only for CE. Taken 
together, these results allow us to corroborate our initial idea of a positive benefit coming from 
the disclosure of non-financial information such as CED.  
V. CONCLUSION 
                                                        
12 In their article, Lehavy et al. (2011) required at least four analysts. However this would have reduced the final 
sample as only few analysts perform the EPS forecast three year ahead.   
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We examine the role of firms’ nonfinancial disclosures, specifically CED and CSR reporting, 
in reducing analysts’ earnings per share forecast error and dispersion. Whilst there is prior 
evidence that corporate social reporting is associated with lower forecast error for an 
international sample the results for the Unites States are anomalous. Although statistically 
insignificant on its own the United States is the only country for which Dhaliwal et al. (2012) 
report a positive relationship between CSR and forecast error. We are therefore concerned to 
establish whether or not this result is robust. Dhaliwal et al (2012) suggest that social costs are 
less influential in the US than in other countries, and would therefore expect a lesser impact but 
this explanation would be surprising if true. We therefore update Dhaliwal et al.’s (2012) 
evidence, extend the analysis to forecast dispersion as well as forecast bias, given that more 
accurate individual forecasts imply lower dispersion of forecasts, and use a PSM approach to 
test the relationship between nonfinancial disclosures and analysts’ forecast accuracy. 
We are also interested to examine the impact of CO2 emissions disclosure on analysts’ 
forecast accuracy. Again this is driven by a result in the previous literature that we find 
surprising. Eccles et al. (2011) document a relatively strong interest in carbon emission by 
brokers, the source of analysts’ forecasts, in contrast with other elements of social and 
governance information. For users of the Bloomberg information system other than brokers the 
researchers are able to show a clear difference between users based in the US and elsewhere. 
In the US the preponderance of users are more interested in governance related information 
than in social or environmental. For brokers the focus on CED is so strong that, although not 
reported, it is impossible for the dominance of CED over other forms of environmental, social 
and governance information to be explained by international differences. Again it is not clear 
how information regarding the total carbon emissions of firms would aid brokers in their 
assessment of the worth of firms or their calculation of future earnings. Even so the apparent 
focus on this data item apparently exists. 
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Using a sample composed of US firms for which we can establish their CSR and CED 
history during the period 2003-2009 and controlling for potential endogeneity concerns, we 
document that CED and CSR are both positively associated with analysts’ forecast accuracy, 
although the CSR results are weakly related on forecast, with a special concerns for longer 
period. A direct comparison of forecast accuracy and dispersion shows that errors, bias and 
dispersion are lower where firms disclose carbon emissions (statistically significant at 
conventional levels) while it is slightly  supported by statistical evidence when firms issue a 
CSR report. Our results mostly agree with  previous finding of Dhaliwal et al. (2012) that CSR 
is slightly influential for analysts forecasts in the US and the ones of Eccles et al. (2011) who 
report that CED dominates more general CSR as a focus of interest for analysts. 
Our interpretation of these results remains cautious. It is clearly possible that a standard 
pooled cross-sectional and time-series model of this type could be subject to endogeneity so we 
use the PSM technique to provides greater assurance that the estimated results are not driven 
by omitted unobservable firm characteristics. Even so in the absence of a clear explanation as 
to how CED and CSR impact on analysts’ work in forecasting earnings we are tempted to look 
further for explanations of the association between forecast accuracy and nonfinancial 
disclosures. 
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Appendix A - Variable identification 
Variable Source Code 
Date of fiscal year end Datastream WC05350 
Stock Exchange Datastream 
STOCK 
EXCHANGES 
LISTED 
Industry Datastream 
INDUSTRY 
GROUP 
Common shares outstanding Datastream WC05301 
Market Price – fiscal year end Datastream WC05001 
Total assets Datastream WC02999 
Common shareholders' equity Datastream WC03501 
Net income Datastream WC01706 
Total debt  Datastream WC03255 
Net sales or revenues Datastream WC01001 
Capital expenditure Datastream WC04601 
Analyst EPS forecast IBES (summary History) Meanest 
Analyst EPS forecast # Num. of estimates IBES (summary History) Numest  
Analyst EPS forecast – St. Dev. IBES (summary History) Stdev  
Analyst EPS forecast issuing date  IBES (summary History) Statpers  
Analyst EPS forecast period end  IBES (summary History) Fpedats  
EPS actual IBES (summary History) Actual  
EPS actual report date IBES (summary History) Anndats  
Stock price forecast issued date IBES (summary History) Price  
Environmental Score ASSET4 ENVSCORE 
Governance Score ASSET4 CGVSCORE 
Bribery, Corruption and Fraud 
Controversies 
ASSET4 SOCOO10V 
CSR sustainability index ASSET4 CGVSDP013 
CO2 equivalents emission total ASSET4 ENERDP023 
CSR sustainability reporting ASSET4 CGVSDP026 
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Appendix B - Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
CSR Index 
1 if a firm reports on belonging to a specific sustainability index, 
such as FTSE4Good or DJSI, 0 otherwise. 
CSR reporting 
(CSR) 
1 if a company publish a separate CSR/H&S/Sustainability report 
or publish a section in its annual report on CSR/H&S/Sustainability, 
0 otherwise. 
Emission Disclosure 
(CED)  
1 if firm i is at time t followed by ASSET4 (i.e. has a value of 
Environmental score) and discloses CO2 Equivalents Emission 
Total, 0 otherwise.  
Bribery, Corruption 
and Fraud 
Controversies 
1 if firm i is at time t under the spotlight of the media because of a 
controversy linked to bribery and corruption, political contributions, 
improper lobbying, money laundering, parallel imports or any tax 
fraud, 0 otherwise.  
Gov_Score 
Measured as the difference between firm i governance performance 
score (as provided by Asset4) over the minimum score for each 
industry-year (e.g., Francis et al., 2005).  
Cross Listing 1 if a firms is listed in more than 1 stock exchange, 0 otherwise.  
Var_Earning 
Natural logarithm of standard deviation of a firm net income, 
deflated by number of share, on the rolling window [t-1,t-2,t-3] 
Loss 1 if a firm reports negative earnings at time t, 0 otherwise. 
Size Natural logarithm of a firm’s total asset at time t-1. 
ESI 
1 if a firm operates through an environmentally sensitive industries 
(i.e. 2-digit SIC codes 13, 26, 28, 29, 33), 0 otherwise. (Peters and 
Romi, 2014, p. 648) 
Lev Ratio between total value of debt and lagged value of total assets. 
ROA Ratio between net income and lagged value of total assets. 
Capex Ratio between capital expenditure over lagged value of total assets. 
Portion 
Ratio between firm’s revenues over the total value of revenues 
calculated by industry-year. 
TobinQ 
Ratio between the sum of market capitalization (stock market price 
multiplied by the number of shares outstanding at the fiscal year 
end) and total debt over lagged value of total assets. 
Bias FY 1,2,3  
Difference between mean EPS one, two and three year ahead 
forecasted and EPS realized (as provided by IBES) scaled by the 
stock price at the time of issuance of the forecast (as provided by 
IBES). 
Error FY 1,2,3 
Absolute value of the difference between mean EPS one, two and 
three year ahead forecasted and EPS realized (as provided by IBES) 
scaled by the stock price at the time of issuance of the forecast (as 
provided by IBES) 
Analyst FY 1,2,3 
Is the natural logarithm of a number of analysts producing EPS 
forecast for each different period (as provided by IBES). 
Dispersion FY 1,2,3 
Is the EPS standard deviation of EPS forecast for each different 
period (as provided by IBES) scaled by the stock price at the time 
of issuance of the forecast (as provided by IBES). 
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Table 1: Sample selection criteria 
10,070 
All the US firm-year observations for firms included into 
the ASSET4 North America Constituent List  
[i.e. 1,007 firms from 2000 to 2009] 
observations dropped reason for dropping 
863 Missing information on date of fiscal year-end 
2,800 Fiscal year-end different from 31st of December 
2,322 Missing accounting variables from Datastream 
15 Missing market variables from Datastream 
1,286 Missing environmental variables from ASSET4 
59 Negative book value of equity 
2,725 
Final sample – firm-year observations 
[i.e. 597 firms from 2003 to 2009]  
 
 
Table 2: Sample distribution 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
         
CED (0) 178 277 286 259 273 386 372 2,031 
CED (1) 30 35 66 98 119 135 211 694 
Total 208 312 352 357 392 521 583 2,725 
         
         
CSR (0) 202 305 343 340 282 381 405 2,258 
CSR (1) 6 7 9 17 110 140 178 467 
Total 208 312 352 357 392 521 583 2,725 
         
Dependent Variables         
Error FY1 207 301 344 353 389 513 575 2,682 
Error FY2 207 301 343 353 389 512 573 2,678 
Error FY3 163 229 300 329 371 458 535 2,385 
Dispersion FY1 207 301 344 353 389 513 575 2,682 
Dispersion FY2 207 301 343 353 389 512 573 2,678 
Dispersion FY3 163 229 300 329 371 458 535 2,385 
Bias FY1 207 301 344 353 389 513 575 2,682 
Bias FY2 207 301 343 353 389 512 573 2,678 
Bias FY3 163 229 300 329 371 458 535 2,385 
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Table 3: descriptive statistics 
Panel A – dependent variables and firm control variables 
 
Variable  Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min 25° Median 75° Max 
CSR Index 2725 0.0906 0.2872 0 0 0 0 1 
Var_Earninga 2725 -0.5448 1.2237 -3.3171 -1.3700 -0.6178 0.1676 3.1448 
Loss 2725 0.1317 0.3383 0 0 0 0 1 
Sizea 2725 16.1380 1.4075 13.3071 15.1338 15.9681 17.0461 20.4174 
Leveragea 2725 0.2876 0.2051 0 0.1364 0.2565 0.4024 1.0178 
Bribery 2725 0.1314 0.3379 0 0 0 0 1 
Cross Listing 2725 0.8870 0.3167 0 1 1 1 1 
Gov_Score 2725 22.2676 20.2403 0 2.1300 19.1600 35.4600 85.9600 
ROAa 2725 0.0539 0.0798 -0.2334 0.0140 0.0415 0.0907 0.3613 
Capexa 2725 0.0565 0.0706 0 0.0128 0.0367 0.0682 0.4164 
TobinQa 2725 1.6265 1.6147 0.1234 0.7224 1.1558 1.8752 10.4148 
Portiona 2725 0.1807 0.2241 0.0019 0.0343 0.0857 0.2368 1 
ESI 2725 0.1908 0.3930 0 0 0 0 1 
Error FY1a 2682 0.0241 0.0623 0 0.0026 0.0071 0.0191 0.5 
Error FY2a 2678 0.0344 0.0580 0.0002 0.0054 0.0143 0.0368 0.3755 
Error FY3a 2385 0.0457 0.0682 0.0002 0.0087 0.0228 0.0538 0.4381 
Analyst FY1a 2682 2.5071 0.6055 0.6931 2.1972 2.6391 2.9444 3.4965 
Analyst FY2a 2678 2.3745 0.6373 0 2.0794 2.4849 2.8332 3.3673 
Analyst FY3a 2385 1.0946 0.7459 0 0.6931 1.0986 1.6094 2.7081 
Dispersion FY1a 2682 0.0081 0.0181 0.0002 0.0013 0.0028 0.0076 0.1369 
Dispersion FY2a 2678 0.0107 0.0183 0 0.0024 0.0048 0.0112 0.1323 
Dispersion FY3a 2385 0.0108 0.0180 0 0.0011 0.0048 0.0125 0.1170 
Bias FY1a 2682 0.0044 0.0526 -0.1378 -0.0076 -0.0011 0.0062 0.3722 
Bias FY2a 2678 0.0086 0.0598 -0.1919 -0.0105 0.0013 0.0196 0.3150 
Bias FY3a 2385 0.0144 0.0724 -0.2470 -0.0105 0.0075 0.0354 0.3565 
CED  2725 0.2547 0.4358 0 0 0 1 1 
CSR 2725 0.1714 0.3769 0 0 0 0 1 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Panel B – dependent variables and firm control variables grouped by CED 
 
 CED (NO) CED (YES)  
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Median Obs. Mean St. Dev. Median 
Wilcoxon T-test 
Mean 
CSR Index 2031 0.0222 0.1472 0 694 0.2911 0.4546 0 *** 
Var_Earninga 2031 -0.5691 1.2407 -0.6451 694 -0.4736 1.1705 -0.5506 ** 
Loss 2031 0.1472 0.3544 0 694 0.0865 0.2812 0 *** 
Sizea 2031 15.8726 1.3421 15.6985 694 16.9145 1.3038 16.8911 *** 
Leveragea 2031 0.2910 0.2198 0.2526 694 0.2778 0.1536 0.2658 Ns 
Bribery 2031 0.0876 0.2828 0 694 0.2594 0.4386 0 *** 
Cross Listing 2031 0.8744 0.3314 1 694 0.9236 0.2658 1 *** 
Gov_Score 2031 20.7221 19.8229 17.13 694 26.7908 20.7789 24.6750 *** 
ROAa 2031 0.0519 0.0837 0.0398 694 0.0599 0.0668 0.0465 *** 
Capexa 2031 0.0581 0.0779 0.0336 694 0.0517 0.0424 0.0434 *** 
TobinQa 2031 1.7022 1.7628 1.1916 694 1.4048 1.0390 1.0747 Ns 
Portiona 2031 0.1568 0.2088 0.0731 694 0.2505 0.2515 0.1569 *** 
ESI 2031 0.1536 0.3607 0 694 0.2997 0.4585 0 *** 
Error FY1a 1988 0.0262 0.0666 0.0076 694 0.0180 0.0471 0.0057 *** 
Error FY2a 1984 0.0365 0.0612 0.0159 694 0.0284 0.0471 0.0104 *** 
Error FY3a 1713 0.0498 0.0723 0.0249 672 0.0352 0.0549 0.0174 *** 
Analyst FY1a 1988 2.4414 0.6379 2.5649 694 2.6951 0.4515 2.7726 *** 
Analyst FY2a 1984 2.3099 0.6684 2.4849 694 2.5594 0.4943 2.6391 *** 
Analyst FY3a 1713 0.9665 0.7176 1.0986 672 1.4212 0.7169 1.3863 *** 
Dispersion FY1a 1988 0.0086 0.0193 0.0029 694 0.0069 0.0140 0.0027 Ns 
Dispersion FY2a 1984 0.0111 0.0195 0.0049 694 0.0096 0.0144 0.0045 Ns 
Dispersion FY3a 1713 0.0108 0.0187 0.0044 672 0.0110 0.0161 0.0058 *** 
Bias FY1a 1988 0.0056 0.0557 -0.0009 694 0.0010 0.0423 -0.0015 ** 
Bias FY2a 1984 0.0100 0.0625 0.0015 694 0.0043 0.0512 0.0007 Ns 
Bias FY3a 1713 0.0165 0.0772 0.0081 672 0.0093 0.0579 0.0064 Ns 
CED  2031 0 0 0 694 1 0 1 - 
CSR 2031 0.0547 0.2274 0 694 0.5130 0.5002 1 *** 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.   
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Panel C – dependent variables and firm control variables grouped by CSR  
 
 CSR (NO) CSR (YES)  
Variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Median Obs. Mean St. Dev. Median 
Wilcoxon T-test 
Mean 
CSR Index 2258 0.0394 0.1946 0 467 0.3383 0.4736 0 *** 
Var_Earninga 2258 -0.5614 1.2351 -0.6348 467 -0.4643 1.1645 -0.5320 * 
Loss 2258 0.1324 0.3390 0 467 0.1285 0.3350 0 Ns 
Sizea 2258 15.9789 1.3605 15.8441 467 16.9069 1.3784 16.8408 *** 
Leveragea 2258 0.2893 0.2139 0.2535 467 0.2794 0.1557 0.2718 Ns 
Bribery 2258 0.1045 0.3060 0 467 0.2612 0.4398 0 *** 
Cross Listing 2258 0.8826 0.3219 1 467 0.9079 0.2894 1 Ns 
Gov_Score 2258 20.8177 19.9510 17.2600 467 29.2783 20.1849 27.6000 *** 
ROAa 2258 0.0545 0.0826 0.0415 467 0.0510 0.0648 0.0414 Ns 
Capexa 2258 0.0569 0.0738 0.0350 467 0.0543 0.0524 0.0458 *** 
TobinQa 2258 1.7129 1.7154 1.2162 467 1.2088 0.8819 0.9485 *** 
Portiona 2258 0.1683 0.2168 0.0789 467 0.2406 0.2482 0.1533 *** 
ESI 2258 0.1785 0.3830 0 467 0.2505 0.4338 0 *** 
Error FY1a 2215 0.0243 0.0639 0.0070 467 0.0229 0.0536 0.0077 Ns 
Error FY2a 2211 0.0346 0.0598 0.0143 467 0.0334 0.0481 0.0146 Ns 
Error FY3a 1928 0.0468 0.0693 0.0235 457 0.0413 0.0628 0.0188 ** 
Analyst FY1a 2215 2.4761 0.6302 2.6391 467 2.6540 0.4429 2.7726 *** 
Analyst FY2a 2211 2.3420 0.6613 2.4849 467 2.5286 0.4798 2.6391 *** 
Analyst FY3a 1928 1.0055 0.7421 1.0986 457 1.4704 0.6376 1.6094 *** 
Dispersion FY1a 2215 0.0079 0.0184 0.0028 467 0.0090 0.0167 0.0035 *** 
Dispersion FY2a 2211 0.0104 0.0185 0.0046 467 0.0122 0.0173 0.0057 *** 
Dispersion FY3a 1928 0.0101 0.0176 0.0042 457 0.0140 0.0196 0.0072 *** 
Bias FY1a 2215 0.0044 0.0531 -0.0011 467 0.0044 0.0501 -0.0013 Ns 
Bias FY2a 2211 0.0092 0.0605 0.0012 467 0.0054 0.0561 0.0019 Ns 
Bias FY3a 1928 0.0153 0.0735 0.0073 457 0.0107 0.0671 0.0079 Ns 
CED  2258 0.1497 0.3568 0 467 0.7623 0.4261 1 *** 
CSR 2258 0 0 0 467 1 0 1 - 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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Table 4: Correlation analysis  
 # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
CSR Index 1 1             
Var_Earninga 2 0.0162 1            
Loss 3 -0.0436 0.2341* 1           
Sizea 4 0.2156* 0.1961* -0.0095 1          
Leveragea 5 -0.0173 -0.1189* 0.0865* -0.049 1         
Bribery 6 0.1951* 0.0921* -0.0102 0.3308* -0.1152* 1        
Cross Listing 7 0.0885* -0.0553* -0.1180* 0.1999* -0.017 0.0977* 1       
Gov_Score 8 0.0979* 0.0698* 0.0192 0.2012* -0.0463 0.0732* 0.0203 1      
ROAa 9 0.0437 -0.1517* -0.5534* -0.2606* -0.1887* 0.0123 0.0970* -0.0387 1     
Capexa 10 -0.0331 -0.0820* -0.0234 -0.2389* 0.2288* -0.1026* 0.0075 -0.0018 0.1663* 1    
TobinQa 11 -0.0375 -0.2080* -0.1207* -0.4740* 0.0017 -0.0479 0.0502* -0.0920* 0.5430* 0.2199* 1   
Portiona 12 0.2460* 0.0306 -0.0405 0.2299* 0.0372 0.1676* 0.1327* -0.2337* 0.0303 -0.0655* 0.007 1  
ESI 13 0.0321 0.0655* 0.029 -0.0966* -0.0276 0.0268 -0.0538* -0.0052 0.1325* 0.3574* 0.1205* -0.0962* 1 
Error FY1a 14 -0.0268 0.2033* 0.3160* 0.0996* 0.0581* -0.018 -0.0600* 0.0027 -0.2398* -0.0443 -0.1705* 0.0231 -0.0349 
Error FY2a 15 -0.0405 0.2130* 0.2663* 0.0730* 0.0393 -0.0245 -0.0520* -0.0256 -0.2094* -0.0035 -0.1866* 0.013 0.0384 
Error FY3a 16 -0.0658* 0.2189* 0.2500* 0.0406 0.0833* -0.0570* -0.0836* 0 -0.1769* 0.0413 -0.1578* -0.0189 0.0581* 
Analyst FY1a 17 0.1327* 0.0546* -0.0734* 0.3025* -0.2662* 0.2132* 0.2006* 0.1404* 0.1543* -0.0028 0.1342* 0.0678* 0.1773* 
Analyst FY2a 18 0.1298* 0.0510* -0.0785* 0.3004* -0.2664* 0.2159* 0.1899* 0.1436* 0.1542* -0.0281 0.1382* 0.0594* 0.1520* 
Analyst FY3a 19 0.1738* 0.1188* 0.0306 0.2708* -0.0860* 0.2126* 0.0950* 0.0429 0.0493 0.0571* 0.1023* 0.0568* 0.2251* 
Dispersion FY1a 20 -0.0204 0.2415* 0.4152* 0.0811* 0.0517* -0.0106 -0.0765* 0.0378 -0.2691* 0.0361 -0.1900* -0.0029 0.0424 
Dispersion FY2a 21 -0.0341 0.2536* 0.4219* 0.0396 0.0588* -0.0277 -0.0967* 0.0157 -0.2677* 0.0951* -0.1880* -0.0212 0.1103* 
Dispersion FY3a 22 -0.0138 0.1841* 0.3043* 0.0476 0.0473 -0.0015 -0.0335 0.0109 -0.1902* 0.1356* -0.1334* -0.0369 0.1639* 
Bias FY1a 23 0.0011 0.0606* 0.0974* 0.1177* 0.0421 -0.0072 0.0108 -0.033 -0.0787* -0.0783* -0.0667* 0.0528* -0.0792* 
Bias FY2a 24 -0.0283 0.1122* 0.0406 0.1328* 0.0308 -0.0107 0.0313 -0.0305 -0.0596* -0.0739* -0.0656* 0.0139 -0.0951* 
Bias FY3a 25 -0.0261 0.0999* 0.0780* 0.1476* 0.0456 -0.0108 0.0398 -0.0023 -0.1008* -0.0721* -0.0699* -0.0122 -0.0940* 
CED  26 0.4081* 0.034 -0.0783* 0.3226* -0.0281 0.2215* 0.0677* 0.1307* 0.0439 -0.0392 -0.0803* 0.1822* 0.1620* 
CSR 27 0.3923* 0.0299 -0.0044 0.2485* -0.0181 0.1748* 0.0301 0.1575* -0.0165 -0.0142 -0.1176* 0.1216* 0.0691* 
Continues… 
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 # 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Error FY1a 14 1              
Error FY2a 15 0.6657* 1             
Error FY3a 16 0.5711* 0.6999* 1            
Analyst FY1a 17 -0.1017* -0.0613* -0.0620* 1           
Analyst FY2a 18 -0.0949* -0.0578* -0.0626* 0.9650* 1          
Analyst FY3a 19 -0.0537* -0.0208 -0.0496 0.5408* 0.5665* 1         
Dispersion FY1a 20 0.7325* 0.5851* 0.5740* -0.0822* -0.0834* -0.0244 1        
Dispersion FY2a 21 0.6681* 0.5807* 0.5963* -0.0593* -0.0545* 0.0153 0.9204* 1       
Dispersion FY3a 22 0.3926* 0.4047* 0.4380* 0.0938* 0.1013* 0.2774* 0.5751* 0.6784* 1      
Bias FY1a 23 0.5832* 0.3517* 0.2347* -0.0109 -0.0184 -0.013 0.3281* 0.2741* 0.2216* 1     
Bias FY2a 24 0.3043* 0.3745* 0.1946* -0.0156 -0.0109 0.0055 0.1940* 0.1389* 0.0992* 0.5674* 1    
Bias FY3a 25 0.2510* 0.1689* 0.2728* 0.0149 0.0276 0.0003 0.1901* 0.1489* 0.1297* 0.4289* 0.6685* 1   
CED  26 -0.0576* -0.0612* -0.0965* 0.1836* 0.1716* 0.2743* -0.0403 -0.0365 0.0061 -0.0381 -0.042 -0.0448 1  
CSR 27 -0.0087 -0.0077 -0.0317 0.1114* 0.1111* 0.2453* 0.0229 0.0365 0.0850* -0.0005 -0.0242 -0.0249 0.5299* 1 
 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. * Denotes significance at the 1%, using a two-tailed test.  
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Table 5: Logit Model for PSM – Determinants of CED disclosure and CSR reporting 
Panel A: Forecast horizon 1 year ahead  
 
 CED CSR 
 Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
Analyst FY1a 0.1430 1.26 0.207 0.2268 1.7* 0.089 
Bribery 0.3690 2.36** 0.018 0.2415 1.3 0.193 
Cross Listing 0.0862 0.45 0.656 0.0333 0.16 0.872 
Gov_Score 0.0112 3.79*** 0 0.0196 5.51*** 0 
ROAa 2.2401 1.84* 0.066 2.6309 1.7* 0.089 
CSR Index 2.2651 11.52*** 0 2.0632 10.51*** 0 
ESI 1.5557 10.34*** 0 0.9284 5.19*** 0 
Var_Earninga -0.0993 -2.03** 0.042 -0.1470 -2.59*** 0.01 
Loss -0.6849 -3.03** 0.002 -0.2713 -1.13 0.258 
Sizea 0.5177 9.38*** 0 0.3879 5.92*** 0 
Portiona 1.3165 4.98*** 0 1.4597 4.58*** 0 
Leveragea 0.6868 2.27** 0.023 0.4946 1.35 0.179 
TobinQa -0.0368 -0.64 0.522 -0.2647 -2.86*** 0.004 
Capexa -2.4544 -2.61*** 0.009 -0.0184 -0.02 0.986 
       
Year Control Yes   Yes   
       
Constant -12.3642 -13.5*** 0 -12.2038 -10.64*** 0 
       
N 2,682   2,682   
Treated-Support 503   300   
Pseudo R² 0,2841   0,3523   
       
ATT Treated Controls T-stat Treated Controls T-stat 
Error FY1  1.6395 2.7298 -2.20** 2.2540 3.0670 -1.34 
Bias FY1  -0.1617 0.8443 -2.41** 0.2566 1.0394 -1.49 
Dispersion FY1  0.6428 0.8570 -1.72* 0.9075 1.0318 -0.71 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. See Appendices A and B for variable definitions. Dependent variables have 
been multiplied by 100. 
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Panel B: Forecast horizon 2 year ahead  
 
 
 CED CSR 
 Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
Analyst FY2a 0.0362 0.34 0.733 0.1760 1.4 0.163 
Bribery 0.3749 2.39** 0.017 0.2421 1.31 0.192 
Cross Listing 0.0969 0.5 0.616 0.0338 0.16 0.87 
Gov_Score 0.0113 3.84*** 0 0.0196 5.51*** 0 
ROAa 2.2817 1.88* 0.06 2.6338 1.7* 0.089 
CSR Index 2.2748 11.55*** 0 2.0662 10.52*** 0 
ESI 1.5762 10.51*** 0 0.9422 5.3*** 0 
Var_Earninga -0.1000 -2.05** 0.04 -0.1468 -2.59*** 0.01 
Loss -0.6833 -3.03*** 0.002 -0.2746 -1.15 0.252 
Sizea 0.5368 9.72*** 0 0.3956 6.04*** 0 
Portiona 1.3048 4.94*** 0 1.4542 4.56*** 0 
Leveragea 0.6211 2.05** 0.04 0.4659 1.27 0.205 
TobinQa -0.0260 -0.45 0.65 -0.2598 -2.82*** 0.005 
Capexa -2.3524 -2.53** 0.012 0.0414 0.04 0.967 
       
Year Control Yes   Yes   
       
Constant -12.4103 -13.5*** 0 -12.1641 -10.59*** 0 
       
N 2,678   2,678   
Treated-Support 497   305   
Pseudo R² 0,2837   0,3521   
       
ATT Treated Controls T-stat Treated Controls T-stat 
Error FY2  2.8520 3.9295 -2.43** 3.5147 4.2247 -1.23 
Bias FY2  0.2211 1.5568 -2.84*** 0.2904 1.4572 -2** 
Dispersion FY2  0.9465 1.1494 -1.62 1.2694 1.3320 -0.32 
 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. See Appendices A and B for variable definitions. Dependent variables have 
been multiplied by 100. 
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Panel C: Forecast horizon 3 year ahead  
 
 CED CSR 
 Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
Analyst FY3a 0.2993 3.25*** 0.001 0.3879 3.46*** 0.001 
Bribery 0.3464 2.17** 0.03 0.2287 1.22 0.224 
Cross Listing 0.0724 0.36 0.719 -0.0145 -0.07 0.946 
Gov_Score 0.0115 3.77*** 0 0.0206 5.63*** 0 
ROAa 2.1586 1.76* 0.078 2.2744 1.45 0.148 
CSR Index 2.1732 10.83*** 0 2.0051 10.06*** 0 
ESI 1.5284 9.78*** 0 0.8661 4.76*** 0 
Var_Earninga -0.0886 -1.74* 0.082 -0.1311 -2.23** 0.026 
Loss -0.6795 -2.93*** 0.003 -0.3412 -1.38 0.168 
Sizea 0.4539 7.96*** 0 0.3090 4.51*** 0 
Portiona 1.3424 4.86*** 0 1.5441 4.68*** 0 
Leveragea 0.7952 2.59*** 0.009 0.5505 1.49 0.137 
TobinQa -0.0791 -1.33 0.184 -0.3245 -3.36*** 0.001 
Capexa -3.2716 -3.3*** 0.001 -0.5943 -0.56 0.575 
       
Year Control Yes   Yes   
       
Constant -11.0895 -11.09*** 0 -10.3126 -8.36*** 0 
       
N 2,385   2,385   
Treated-Support 490   294   
Pseudo R² 0,2786   0,3469   
       
ATT Treated Controls T-stat Treated Controls T-stat 
Error FY3 3.7923 5.2659 -2.89*** 4.4106 4.9260 -0.77 
Bias FY3 0.8377 2.2551 -2.5** 1.1105 1.9902 -1.25 
Dispersion FY3 1.1050 1.3341 -1.64 1.4533 1.3883 0.32 
 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. See Appendices A and B for variable definitions. Dependent variables have 
been multiplied by 100. 
 
  
39 
 
Table 6: Differences in Variable Means after Propensity-Score-Matching (main variables) 
Panel A: Forecast horizon 1 year ahead  
 
 CED Mean CSR Mean 
Variable Treated Control t p>t Treated Control t p>t 
Analyst FY1a 2.6251 2.5809 1.24 0.213 2.5734 2.6178 -1.02 0.307 
Bribery 0.1809 0.1730 0.33 0.741 0.1567 0.1600 -0.11 0.911 
Cross Listing 0.9086 0.9046 0.22 0.829 0.8733 0.8700 0.12 0.903 
Gov_Score 25.7710 24.5710 0.93 0.354 27.6650 28.0390 -0.23 0.82 
ROAa 0.0545 0.0556 -0.25 0.803 0.0449 0.0529 -1.39 0.166 
CSR Index 0.1332 0.1471 -0.64 0.525 0.0700 0.1567 -3.37*** 0.001 
ESI 0.2505 0.2406 0.37 0.714 0.2333 0.2833 -1.4 0.162 
Year 2004 0.0636 0.0537 0.67 0.503 0.0233 0.0333 -0.74 0.461 
Year 2005 0.0994 0.0994 0 1 0.0300 0.0233 0.51 0.613 
Year 2006 0.1431 0.1928 -2.11** 0.035 0.0567 0.1033 -2.11** 0.035 
Year 2007 0.1650 0.1630 0.09 0.932 0.2333 0.2267 0.19 0.846 
Year 2008 0.2008 0.2088 -0.31 0.755 0.3067 0.2700 0.99 0.322 
Year 2009 0.2783 0.2485 1.07 0.283 0.3300 0.3067 0.61 0.54 
Var_Earninga -0.5282 -0.5289 0.01 0.992 -0.5080 -0.5277 0.2 0.841 
Loss 0.0954 0.0875 0.44 0.662 0.1467 0.1400 0.23 0.816 
Sizea 16.6270 16.5970 0.35 0.723 16.5500 16.4710 0.73 0.466 
Portiona 0.2113 0.2166 -0.34 0.733 0.1907 0.1914 -0.04 0.97 
Leveragea 0.2797 0.2920 -1.06 0.288 0.2850 0.2890 -0.26 0.795 
TobinQa 1.3884 1.4161 -0.35 0.725 1.1900 1.3765 -2.09** 0.037 
Capexa 0.0523 0.0553 -0.8 0.423 0.0560 0.0568 -0.16 0.875 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Panel B: Forecast horizon 2 year ahead  
 
 CED Mean CSR Mean 
Variable Treated Control t p>t Treated Control t p>t 
Analyst FY2a 2.4906 2.4637 0.7 0.482 2.4428 2.3820 1.3 0.195 
Bribery 0.1811 0.1751 0.25 0.804 0.1508 0.1312 0.7 0.486 
Cross Listing 0.9135 0.8893 1.28 0.202 0.8787 0.8721 0.24 0.807 
Gov_Score 25.6130 25.2750 0.26 0.795 27.6930 27.2810 0.25 0.805 
ROAa 0.0557 0.0509 1.17 0.241 0.0461 0.0473 -0.24 0.809 
CSR Index 0.1167 0.1006 0.81 0.415 0.1016 0.1443 -1.6 0.109 
ESI 0.2415 0.2113 1.14 0.256 0.2197 0.2689 -1.41 0.158 
Year 2004 0.0624 0.0342 2.07** 0.038 0.0230 0.0262 -0.26 0.794 
Year 2005 0.1026 0.0986 0.21 0.833 0.0295 0.0230 0.51 0.613 
Year 2006 0.1529 0.1509 0.09 0.93 0.0557 0.0590 -0.17 0.862 
Year 2007 0.1630 0.1670 -0.17 0.864 0.2230 0.2361 -0.38 0.701 
Year 2008 0.1992 0.1811 0.73 0.467 0.3115 0.2689 1.16 0.247 
Year 2009 0.2656 0.3300 -2.22** 0.026 0.3377 0.3344 0.09 0.932 
Var_Earninga -0.5139 -0.4523 -0.79 0.428 -0.5154 -0.6348 1.2 0.23 
Loss 0.0946 0.1087 -0.73 0.463 0.1443 0.1541 -0.34 0.734 
Sizea 16.6420 16.6100 0.37 0.715 16.5470 16.4620 0.81 0.419 
Portiona 0.2154 0.2325 -1.06 0.291 0.1878 0.1995 -0.65 0.518 
Leveragea 0.2819 0.2822 -0.03 0.978 0.2822 0.2816 0.04 0.965 
TobinQa 1.4041 1.2976 1.41 0.158 1.1952 1.2427 -0.58 0.562 
Capexa 0.0530 0.0518 0.32 0.747 0.0550 0.0546 0.08 0.938 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Panel C: Forecast horizon 3 year ahead  
 
 CED Mean CSR Mean 
Variable Treated Control t p>t Treated Control t p>t 
Analyst FY3a 1.2923 1.2439 1.1 0.271 1.3231 1.3663 -0.78 0.437 
Bribery 0.1980 0.2122 -0.55 0.58 0.1531 0.1871 -1.1 0.273 
Cross Listing 0.9102 0.9327 -1.31 0.192 0.8844 0.8674 0.62 0.533 
Gov_Score 25.2980 25.5470 -0.19 0.846 27.2900 28.5400 -0.73 0.466 
ROAa 0.0562 0.0521 0.88 0.379 0.0455 0.0511 -1.01 0.312 
CSR Index 0.1286 0.1347 -0.28 0.777 0.1054 0.1122 -0.26 0.792 
ESI 0.2694 0.2225 1.71* 0.088 0.2313 0.2313 0 1 
Year 2004 0.0551 0.0469 0.58 0.562 0.0204 0.0238 -0.28 0.78 
Year 2005 0.1020 0.0959 0.32 0.749 0.0306 0.0340 -0.23 0.816 
Year 2006 0.1612 0.1796 -0.76 0.445 0.0578 0.0714 -0.67 0.503 
Year 2007 0.1674 0.2082 -1.64 0.102 0.2449 0.2415 0.1 0.924 
Year 2008 0.2020 0.2041 -0.08 0.937 0.2721 0.2857 -0.37 0.714 
Year 2009 0.2674 0.2245 1.56 0.12 0.3537 0.3061 1.23 0.22 
Var_Earninga -0.4732 -0.4975 0.31 0.755 -0.4932 -0.5176 0.25 0.8 
Loss 0.1020 0.1122 -0.52 0.606 0.1531 0.1191 1.2 0.23 
Sizea 16.6900 16.7940 -1.13 0.258 16.6030 16.6990 -0.84 0.403 
Portiona 0.2127 0.2348 -1.41 0.158 0.1928 0.1966 -0.2 0.841 
Leveragea 0.2801 0.2717 0.75 0.452 0.2879 0.2764 0.77 0.441 
TobinQa 1.3842 1.3098 0.91 0.363 1.1955 1.2444 -0.6 0.549 
Capexa 0.0528 0.0511 0.44 0.657 0.0555 0.0491 1.24 0.216 
 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Table 7: Regression result on the matched sample 
Panel A: Forecast horizon 1 year ahead  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ErrorFY1 BiasFY1 DispFY1 ErrorFY1 BiasFY1 DispFY1 
CED -1.0995*** -0.9617*** -0.2182**    
 (-2.87) (-2.95) (-2.19)    
CSR    -1.1394** -0.9704* -0.2121 
    (-2.03) (-1.87) (-1.20) 
Bribery -0.5797 -0.0587 -0.2880*** 0.0894 -0.3555 -0.1501 
 (-1.20) (-0.14) (-2.62) (0.12) (-0.47) (-0.69) 
Cross Listing -0.8647 -0.7379 -0.4950** -0.7518 -1.1758 -0.1689 
 (-1.09) (-1.11) (-2.06) (-0.76) (-1.17) (-0.61) 
Gov_Score -0.0017 -0.0061 -0.0001 -0.0063 -0.0076 -0.0030 
 (-0.17) (-0.70) (-0.03) (-0.49) (-0.71) (-0.89) 
Roa 3.0880 4.6202 2.4668* 8.5668 14.5465* 5.5861** 
 (0.58) (0.87) (1.66) (1.15) (1.81) (2.27) 
CSRIndex -1.2816** -0.7715* -0.3053** -1.3475** -0.7012 -0.1259 
 (-2.59) (-1.95) (-2.49) (-1.98) (-0.96) (-0.58) 
ESI -0.1619 -0.7494* 0.0680 -0.2536 -0.6946 -0.0938 
 (-0.35) (-1.83) (0.50) (-0.55) (-1.48) (-0.53) 
Var_EAR 0.6138*** 0.0545 0.1661*** 0.0784 -0.7656** -0.0068 
 (3.01) (0.27) (3.16) (0.24) (-2.25) (-0.06) 
Loss 4.9571*** 2.1897* 1.6747*** 5.1147** 3.4195* 2.6344*** 
 (2.83) (1.68) (3.57) (2.46) (1.68) (4.25) 
Analyst FY1 -0.4823 0.1492 0.1052 -0.9267 -0.1527 -0.1730 
 (-1.16) (0.46) (1.10) (-1.26) (-0.22) (-0.66) 
Size 0.2242 0.2505 0.0985* 0.7657** 0.7599** 0.2214* 
 (1.16) (1.43) (1.88) (2.25) (2.38) (1.85) 
Portion -0.3326 -0.2018 0.0348 -0.4988 0.2103 -0.2706 
 (-0.38) (-0.25) (0.15) (-0.40) (0.17) (-0.72) 
LEV -0.5970 0.6555 0.3906 4.3765* 2.3173 0.9009 
 (-0.78) (0.84) (1.49) (1.82) (1.02) (1.53) 
TobinQ -0.3234 -0.1251 -0.1717*** -0.5034** -0.4484** -0.2202*** 
 (-1.46) (-0.57) (-2.73) (-2.06) (-2.00) (-2.82) 
CAPEX -5.6881** -5.2462* 1.6309* -9.5979** -9.7430** -0.4496 
 (-2.05) (-1.87) (1.88) (-2.20) (-2.53) (-0.36) 
       
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 1.4103 -3.5787 -1.0800 -7.2661 -12.4366** -2.7168 
 (0.49) (-1.28) (-1.32) (-1.42) (-2.52) (-1.50) 
Observations 1006 1006 1006 600 600 600 
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.060 0.308 0.147 0.106 0.274 
F 3.3811 2.4940 7.5233 3.1740 1.8292 5.3567 
Table presents OLS regression results using matched sample (i.e. fweight = _weight) obtained through PSMatch 
procedure. Dependent and Independent variables are as described in Appendix A and B. T statistics in parentheses, 
Standard Error are clustered by firm. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively, 
using a two-tailed test. aContinuous variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Dependent variables have been 
multiplied by 100. 
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Panel B: Forecast horizon 2 year ahead  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ErrorFY2 BiasFY2 DispFY2 ErrorFY2 BiasFY2 DispFY2 
CED -0.9912** -1.1887*** -0.1792    
 (-2.40) (-2.86) (-1.51)    
CSR    -0.8179 -1.3853** -0.1516 
    (-1.39) (-2.36) (-0.89) 
Bribery -0.4794 -0.5654 -0.0818 -0.0919 0.0905 -0.0774 
 (-1.07) (-1.08) (-0.60) (-0.14) (0.13) (-0.38) 
Cross Listing -1.2696 -0.9043 -0.1504 -0.5467 0.6299 -0.0402 
 (-1.53) (-0.99) (-0.63) (-0.68) (0.60) (-0.14) 
Gov_Score -0.0020 -0.0076 0.0007 -0.0104 0.0005 -0.0029 
 (-0.23) (-0.74) (0.26) (-0.94) (0.04) (-0.83) 
Roa 6.8095 5.6301 -0.3913 5.8954 7.5949 0.2924 
 (1.40) (1.05) (-0.22) (0.61) (0.78) (0.10) 
CSRIndex -0.7858* -0.6209 -0.2941* -0.5090 -2.0044** -0.2464 
 (-1.75) (-1.21) (-1.72) (-0.50) (-2.48) (-0.89) 
ESI 0.4760 -1.7824*** 0.3483** 0.7603 -0.4542 0.1784 
 (0.90) (-3.05) (2.26) (0.99) (-0.53) (0.78) 
Var_EAR 0.5983** 0.1800 0.1754*** 0.8806*** 0.4138 0.2509*** 
 (2.27) (0.67) (2.64) (2.75) (1.25) (2.93) 
Loss 2.2948** 1.7192* 1.4966*** 3.3513** 1.3934 1.7449*** 
 (2.16) (1.73) (3.71) (2.24) (1.00) (3.83) 
Analyst FY2 0.1094 -0.7080 0.1528 0.0801 -0.4320 0.0110 
 (0.21) (-1.52) (1.13) (0.12) (-0.65) (0.04) 
Size 0.0137 0.7749*** 0.0240 0.0122 0.3919 0.0289 
 (0.06) (3.30) (0.39) (0.04) (1.40) (0.24) 
Portion -0.8002 -2.2860** 0.0429 -0.0713 -2.4823* -0.0596 
 (-0.91) (-2.30) (0.17) (-0.06) (-1.84) (-0.17) 
LEV 0.9116 0.7347 0.4410 5.7874** 1.7150 1.1776* 
 (0.67) (0.55) (1.15) (2.23) (0.76) (1.86) 
TobinQ -0.9393*** -0.0085 -0.1238* -1.0917*** -0.3768 -0.1854 
 (-4.36) (-0.04) (-1.83) (-2.75) (-0.98) (-1.59) 
CAPEX -3.8688 -0.9359 2.1102** -2.5894 -10.9205** 2.5918 
 (-1.38) (-0.29) (2.49) (-0.53) (-2.21) (1.36) 
       
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 6.6282* -11.0685*** -0.2110 4.0433 -8.0570* -0.1067 
 (1.75) (-2.86) (-0.22) (0.74) (-1.70) (-0.06) 
Observations 994 994 994 610 610 610 
Adjusted R2 0.109 0.140 0.286 0.151 0.157 0.292 
F 4.2856 4.6617 8.7937 3.8227 4.3374 5.9927 
 
Table presents OLS regression results using matched sample (i.e. fweight = _weight) obtained through PSMatch 
procedure. Dependent and Independent variables are as described in Appendix A and B. T statistics in parentheses, 
Standard Error are clustered by firm. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively, 
using a two-tailed test. aContinuous variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Dependent variables have been 
multiplied by 100. 
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Panel C: Forecast horizon 3 year ahead  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ErrorFY3 BiasFY3 DispFY3 ErrorFY3 BiasFY3 DispFY3 
CED -1.4840*** -1.0493** -0.2630**    
 (-3.25) (-2.12) (-2.08)    
CSR    -0.5997 -0.9473 -0.0120 
    (-1.10) (-1.42) (-0.06) 
Bribery -0.4076 0.5046 -0.1634 -0.0874 0.8411 0.0198 
 (-0.64) (0.79) (-1.04) (-0.13) (1.10) (0.08) 
Cross Listing -1.8011* 0.2635 0.0262 0.2896 -0.3986 0.3195 
 (-1.76) (0.20) (0.10) (0.30) (-0.29) (0.71) 
Gov_Score 0.0034 0.0155 0.0006 -0.0013 -0.0024 0.0010 
 (0.26) (1.13) (0.19) (-0.10) (-0.14) (0.26) 
Roa 4.8380 -8.3666 0.0024 -5.5934 -10.3127 3.2117 
 (0.72) (-0.97) (0.00) (-0.64) (-0.93) (1.04) 
CSRIndex -0.8376 -0.5187 -0.2994 -0.5711 0.1518 -0.4199** 
 (-1.21) (-0.65) (-1.65) (-0.77) (0.15) (-2.16) 
ESI 2.6344*** -0.5060 0.6083*** 1.0031 -0.1450 0.5938* 
 (3.59) (-0.58) (3.10) (1.07) (-0.12) (1.70) 
Var_EAR 0.9048*** 0.8652*** 0.2210*** 1.1809*** 0.5399 0.1454 
 (4.34) (2.98) (3.59) (3.43) (1.23) (1.36) 
Loss 2.5284** 0.0902 0.9232** 2.9377** 1.6297 1.7360*** 
 (2.08) (0.07) (2.44) (2.13) (1.01) (3.54) 
AnalystFY3 -0.4041 -1.0089** 0.4296*** -0.0351 -1.0345* 0.7626*** 
 (-1.10) (-2.41) (4.17) (-0.07) (-1.74) (4.53) 
Size 0.3102 1.2914*** 0.0142 -0.4682 0.6490 -0.2310* 
 (0.98) (4.11) (0.18) (-1.32) (1.48) (-1.69) 
Portion 0.5023 -0.8555 -0.0012 -0.3913 -3.4547* -0.0394 
 (0.53) (-0.73) (-0.00) (-0.31) (-1.90) (-0.09) 
LEV 1.7552 1.0469 0.5651 3.6962* -0.1913 1.4852* 
 (1.28) (0.60) (1.59) (1.80) (-0.07) (1.81) 
TobinQ -0.6780** 0.8302** -0.2014** -1.0145** 0.7517 -0.6468*** 
 (-2.16) (2.06) (-2.33) (-2.24) (1.34) (-3.84) 
CAPEX -3.3690 1.7636 3.7144*** 2.0532 -2.0610 2.2677 
 (-0.84) (0.38) (3.50) (0.32) (-0.31) (1.04) 
       
Year Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 4.8487 -27.1184*** -0.0636 16.0910** -12.8631 3.1817 
 (0.76) (-4.55) (-0.05) (2.45) (-1.65) (1.35) 
Observations 980 980 980 588 588 588 
Adjusted R2 0.172 0.178 0.287 0.193 0.107 0.255 
F 5.2890 5.5475 12.0670 4.1854 4.6045 6.1282 
 
Table presents OLS regression results using matched sample (i.e. fweight = _weight) obtained through PSMatch 
procedure. Dependent and Independent variables are as described in Appendix A and B. T statistics in parentheses, 
Standard Error are clustered by firm. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively, 
using a two-tailed test. aContinuous variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Dependent variables have been 
multiplied by 100. 
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Table 8: CED-CSR and Analysts’ Information Environment 
Panel A: Logit Model for PSM – Determinants of CED disclosure and CSR reporting 
 
 CED CSR 
 Coef. z P>z Coef. z P>z 
       
Bribery 0.2629 1.57 0.117 0.2199 1.13 0.257 
Cross Listing 0.0802 0.36 0.722 0.0714 0.3 0.766 
Gov_Score 0.0108 3.25*** 0.001 0.0217 5.55*** 0 
ROAa 3.0371 2.25** 0.024 2.4903 1.47 0.142 
CSR Index 2.1769 10.32*** 0 2.0572 9.79*** 0 
ESI 1.6412 9.91*** 0 0.9890 5.21*** 0 
Var_Earninga -0.0429 -0.76 0.445 -0.0889 -1.4 0.162 
Loss -0.7117 -2.84*** 0.004 -0.4389 -1.65* 0.099 
Sizea 0.5174 8.84*** 0 0.3949 5.8*** 0 
Portiona 1.4493 4.76*** 0 1.5381 4.38*** 0 
Leveragea 0.9536 2.84*** 0.004 0.7274 1.85* 0.064 
TobinQa -0.0651 -1.04 0.297 -0.2944 -2.96*** 0.003 
Capexa -3.5688 -3.3*** 0.001 -0.7035 -0.61 0.544 
       
Year Control Yes   Yes   
       
Constant -11.9856 -11.18*** 0 -11.5766 -8.96*** 0 
       
N 1,888   1,888   
Treated-Support 425   269   
Pseudo R² 0,2747   0,3458   
       
ATT Treated Controls T-stat Treated Controls T-stat 
Uncertainty All FY1  5.1976 6.0965 -3.71*** 5.4535 5.4907 -0.13 
Uncertainty All FY2  5.0024 6.1459 -4.74*** 5.5130 5.6357 -0.43 
Uncertainty All FY3  5.1129 6.1671 -4.56*** 5.6059 5.6394 -0.12 
Uncertainty Com. FY1  5.2894 6.1129 -3.59*** 5.5539 5.1896 1.33 
Uncertainty Com. FY2  5.0918 5.9906 -3.83*** 5.4870 5.4275 0.21 
Uncertainty Com. FY3  4.1624 4.8094 -3.23*** 4.6580 4.5911 0.29 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. ***, **, * Denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent 
levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. See Paragraph 4.4. and Appendices A and B for variable definitions. 
Dependent variables is expressed in decile rank by year. 
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Panel B: Differences in Variable Means after Propensity-Score-Matching (main variables) 
 
 CED Mean CSR Mean 
Variable Treated Control t p>t Treated Control t p>t 
         
Bribery 0.1977 0.2400 -1.49 0.136 0.1599 0.1227 1.24 0.217 
Cross Listing 0.9200 0.9200 0 1 0.8996 0.8885 0.42 0.675 
Gov_Score 25.2330 24.2620 0.71 0.477 27.6640 29.6780 -1.15 0.249 
ROAa 0.0577 0.0559 0.41 0.683 0.0472 0.0596 -2.04 0.042 
CSR Index 0.1271 0.1412 -0.6 0.546 0.1004 0.1115 -0.42 0.675 
ESI 0.2871 0.2306 1.88 0.06 0.2491 0.2714 -0.59 0.556 
Year 2004 0.0494 0.0706 -1.3 0.194 0.0223 0.0186 0.3 0.761 
Year 2005 0.0824 0.0941 -0.6 0.546 0.0223 0.0260 -0.28 0.779 
Year 2006 0.1459 0.1906 -1.74 0.082 0.0595 0.0558 0.18 0.854 
Year 2007 0.1882 0.1906 -0.09 0.93 0.2528 0.2119 1.12 0.262 
Year 2008 0.2024 0.1600 1.6 0.109 0.2825 0.3160 -0.85 0.398 
Year 2009 0.2918 0.2471 1.47 0.142 0.3420 0.3569 -0.36 0.718 
Var_Earninga -0.3994 -0.4267 0.36 0.718 -0.4751 -0.5717 1.03 0.305 
Loss 0.1035 0.0988 0.23 0.82 0.1376 0.1190 0.64 0.52 
Sizea 16.7840 16.8970 -1.23 0.221 16.6860 16.5230 1.48 0.139 
Portiona 0.2162 0.2522 -2.11 0.035 0.1911 0.1714 1.07 0.286 
Leveragea 0.2733 0.2827 -0.69 0.492 0.2852 0.2457 2.55 0.011 
TobinQa 1.3857 1.3453 0.5 0.616 1.1900 1.2740 -0.96 0.337 
Capexa 0.0543 0.0479 1.62 0.105 0.0563 0.0561 0.04 0.968 
a Variables winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  
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Panel C: Regression result on the matched sample – Common Uncertainty 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV: Uncertainty Common FY1 FY2 FY3 FY1 FY2 FY3 
CED -0.8058*** -0.8534*** -0.6220***    
 (-3.60) (-3.61) (-3.03)    
CSR    0.2626 0.0005 0.0247 
    (1.00) (0.00) (0.10) 
Bribery -0.0841 0.0441 -0.2912 0.8606** 0.7266 -0.0453 
 (-0.29) (0.13) (-1.03) (2.24) (1.59) (-0.12) 
Cross Listing -0.3829 -0.9835** -0.1382 -0.0402 -0.0247 0.1277 
 (-0.99) (-2.17) (-0.29) (-0.08) (-0.05) (0.31) 
Gov_Score -0.0035 -0.0044 -0.0102* -0.0005 0.0082 0.0069 
 (-0.63) (-0.70) (-1.95) (-0.07) (1.02) (1.04) 
Roa 2.2676 3.5034 3.6159* 2.4129 4.5423 -1.0816 
 (1.03) (1.42) (1.71) (0.77) (1.45) (-0.48) 
CSRIndex -0.8142** -0.0618 -0.4587* -1.0512** -0.2258 0.1455 
 (-2.26) (-0.16) (-1.75) (-2.17) (-0.43) (0.37) 
ESI 0.3372 0.5404* -0.0007 0.3424 0.5031 0.2552 
 (1.05) (1.71) (-0.00) (0.91) (1.37) (0.83) 
Var_EAR 0.5385*** 0.2544** 0.2588** 0.3177** 0.2401* 0.3003** 
 (5.04) (2.07) (2.43) (2.43) (1.74) (2.59) 
Loss -0.2289 -0.3041 0.0627 -0.5432 -0.2231 -0.7532 
 (-0.46) (-0.63) (0.16) (-0.90) (-0.40) (-1.56) 
Size 0.0329 0.1022 0.1421 -0.0515 -0.1293 -0.2040* 
 (0.32) (0.90) (1.57) (-0.37) (-0.92) (-1.77) 
Portion 0.7855* 1.0850** 1.0815** 1.5212** 1.1340* 1.0346* 
 (1.65) (2.14) (2.49) (2.41) (1.78) (1.85) 
LEV -1.1224 -0.5619 0.4879 -0.0346 0.6871 0.5439 
 (-1.56) (-0.66) (0.82) (-0.04) (0.74) (0.79) 
TobinQ -0.1138 -0.2274** -0.1833** -0.4682* -0.6014** -0.1931 
 (-1.20) (-2.16) (-2.14) (-1.93) (-2.42) (-1.24) 
CAPEX -5.9966** -4.9123** -2.7086 -4.7583** -0.2990 -0.0498 
 (-2.42) (-2.40) (-1.23) (-2.38) (-0.15) (-0.03) 
       
Year control Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 6.4246*** 5.2160** 1.9382 8.7110*** 8.9263*** 8.5276*** 
 (3.45) (2.33) (1.16) (3.67) (3.09) (3.85) 
Observations 850 850 850 538 538 538 
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.058 0.056 0.073 0.027 0.011 
F 4.1897 2.6801 2.7039 3.7795 1.8467 1.2265 
Table presents OLS regression results using matched sample (i.e. fweight = _weight) obtained through PSMatch 
procedure. Dependent variables is the Common level of Uncertainty as defined in paragraph 4.4. Independent variables 
are as described in Appendix A and B. T statistics in parentheses, Standard Error are clustered by firm. ***, **, * Denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. aContinuous variables winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Dependent variables is expressed in decile rank by year.  
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Panel D: Regression result on the matched sample – Overall Uncertainty  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV: Uncertainty All FY1 FY2 FY3 FY1 FY2 FY3 
CED -0.9061*** -1.1629*** -1.0507***    
 (-3.90) (-4.74) (-4.37)    
CSR    -0.2705 -0.3050 -0.1708 
    (-0.94) (-1.00) (-0.59) 
Bribery -0.0983 0.0457 -0.4925* 0.2798 0.3902 -0.1071 
 (-0.35) (0.15) (-1.66) (0.78) (0.95) (-0.27) 
Cross Listing -0.3400 -0.7899** 0.0721 -0.6688 -0.3902 0.3333 
 (-0.99) (-2.17) (0.18) (-1.64) (-0.83) (0.66) 
Gov_Score -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0070 -0.0094 -0.0000 0.0009 
 (-0.03) (0.03) (-1.25) (-1.32) (-0.00) (0.13) 
Roa 3.4325 3.1251 2.2705 4.6358* 3.5868 -0.0153 
 (1.37) (1.42) (1.08) (1.80) (1.43) (-0.01) 
CSRIndex -0.9649*** -0.5091 -0.4710 -0.6437 -0.1152 0.1921 
 (-2.73) (-1.20) (-1.39) (-1.20) (-0.19) (0.38) 
ESI 0.9657*** 1.1327*** 0.8994*** 0.2474 0.5883 0.4174 
 (2.83) (3.28) (2.85) (0.62) (1.42) (1.01) 
Var_EAR 0.8208*** 0.6242*** 0.6153*** 0.6072*** 0.5638*** 0.6514*** 
 (8.13) (5.62) (5.47) (4.47) (4.08) (4.76) 
Loss 1.4312*** 1.0566** 0.7472* 1.3329*** 1.1191** 0.6265 
 (3.42) (2.51) (1.72) (2.60) (2.20) (1.22) 
Size 0.1729 0.1682 0.2577** 0.1660 0.0143 -0.0646 
 (1.64) (1.37) (2.35) (1.16) (0.10) (-0.47) 
Portion 0.9860** 1.3305*** 1.5171*** 1.1128 0.9986 0.6565 
 (2.00) (2.60) (3.06) (1.54) (1.37) (0.95) 
LEV 0.3307 0.2940 0.4766 0.4447 0.6787 0.2460 
 (0.54) (0.42) (0.73) (0.52) (0.75) (0.29) 
TobinQ -0.6560*** -0.5063*** -0.4398*** -0.9903*** -0.8860*** -0.5667*** 
 (-5.53) (-4.41) (-4.32) (-4.55) (-3.99) (-3.17) 
CAPEX 4.4842** 3.8748* 3.4953 6.9519*** 7.6898*** 7.4357*** 
 (2.18) (1.93) (1.60) (3.37) (3.56) (3.55) 
       
Year control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant 3.0149 2.8462 1.2244 6.0864** 7.6489*** 9.4020*** 
 (1.47) (1.22) (0.58) (2.31) (2.67) (3.84) 
Observations 850 850 850 538 538 538 
Adjusted R2 0.275 0.203 0.184 0.234 0.187 0.160 
F 13.9042 8.5154 8.5432 8.0151 6.5874 5.7322 
Table presents OLS regression results using matched sample (i.e. fweight = _weight) obtained through PSMatch 
procedure. Dependent variables is the Overall level of Uncertainty as defined in paragraph 4.4. Independent variables are 
as described in Appendix A and B. T statistics in parentheses, Standard Error are clustered by firm. ***, **, * Denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test. aContinuous variables winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Dependent variables is expressed in decile rank by year.   
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Figure 1: Analysts accuracy timetable  
 
 
 
 
FY end 
Dec - t 
EPS mean forecast 
1, 2 and 3 year ahead
Accounting variables related to 
time t are available at this time
EPS realized t+1 EPS realized t+2 EPS realized t+3
Error (1) 
Abs[(mean EPS_Forecast – EPS 
realized)] / Price at the date of Forecast
Error (2)
Abs[(mean EPS_Forecast – EPS 
realized)] / Price at the date of Forecast
Error (3)
Abs[(mean EPS_Forecast – EPS 
realized)] / Price at the date of Forecast
FY end 
Dec - t+1
FY end 
Dec - t+2
FY end 
Dec - t+3
Third Friday of March
(t+3 months)
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